Malicious code, such as Zero-day exploits, utilize vulnerabilities in Commercial-Off-TheShelf (COTS) software to cause damage in cyberspace. Because of the prevalence of offshore software development, COTS software is exposed to increased vulnerabilities and provides access for our adversaries to manipulate software code. Defense networks are built primarily on COTS products and software because our acquisition rules are focused on streamlined procurement of COTS Information Technology (IT) products in Federal government organizations. This paper will show that updates to our Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs) could increase our understanding of the origin of software code and provide access to source code for in-depth vulnerability analysis providing improved cyber security.
Introduction
Current acquisition rules open the potential for increased Zero-day exploits on Department of Defense networks because of the globalization of the commercial software development process and the access this globalization provides to foreign competitors.
News headlines are filled with claims of cyber security and Zero-day vulnerabilities in commercial software. Java is a software product that is loaded on most everything connected to the internet from television set top boxes to computer web browsers that allow these devices to interface to internet servers in a virtual environment. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a notification that Java software contains vulnerabilities that allow complete undetectable control of the device from a remote system. Oracle Inc., the company that owns Java, didn't acknowledge the existence of this vulnerability until weeks after it was notified by the DHS. 1 A recent Computerworld article claimed Oracle Inc did finally patch its Java software; however researchers quickly pointed out that their patch itself was flawed. 2 Adam Gowdiak, founder and CEO of Security Explorations, has reported dozens of Java vulnerabilities to Oracle over recent years. He argued that Oracle has been guilty of sloppy work 3 . Andrew Storms, director of security operations at nCircle Security, stated, "Obviously, there's something broken in the Java development or design cycles." 4 These comments point to the software development process at Oracle as a part of the problem.
To make this issue more complex, software development teams at Oracle include of software programmers located in the United States and abroad. IT Outsourcing India, an organization that develops high quality software solutions in India, makes the claim that Oracle has their largest software development centers in India. 5 Most commercial software development processes include some software coding from internal or external software development teams located offshore.
This paper will show that the lack of understanding of the origin of software code in the software development process leads to increased vulnerabilities. Providing access to the software development process allows foreign competitors access to software code which may provide them with knowledge of vulnerabilities or the means to create vulnerabilities in the software code. These vulnerabilities might not be identified until long after they have been used to exploit systems. 
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Zero-day vulnerabilities are defined as "an attack that exploits a previously unknown vulnerability in a computer application, meaning that the attack occurs on "day zero" of awareness of the vulnerability." This means that developers have had zero days to address and patch the vulnerability. "Zero-day exploits (actual software that uses the security hole to carry out an attack) are used or shared by attackers before the developer of the target software knows about the vulnerability." Zero-day exploits offer the attacker knowledge of a vulnerability before software developers can address the issue. The vulnerability could be a code flaw that is intentional or unintentional and may not look like malicious code. Intentional or unintentional malicious code is exploitable by those seeking to gain an advantage in cyberspace. Symantec presented a report on Zero-day exploits that shows hackers exploit Zero-day exploits for an average of 10 months before they are exposed. In the Java example introduced earlier in this paper, the attacker could have full control of the exploited device for months before the public could respond by creating a method to detect and/or mitigate the problem. The attacker could use a keylogger that records passwords, access bank accounts, or log into virtual private networks to gain more restrictive information. Figure 2 shows that hackers use these exploits hundreds or thousands of times around the time of their revelation to the public.
11 Figure 2 . Number of Zero-day attacks using exploits over time (in weeks)
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The spike shown in figure 2 indicate the explosion of attackers and attacks up to and after it is disclosed to the public. The vulnerability window for zero-day exploits starts when a developer creates software containing an unknown vulnerability (or known if intentional). The attacker finds the vulnerability before the developer does (or while the developer is aware of but has neglected or been unable to fix it).
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Zero-day exploits are being sold through an underground market from "benevolent hackers" who find and report bugs they identify and hackers that are looking to cash in on their skills. In a recent Slate article, Adriel Desautels, a Zero-day exploit broker that has sold exploits for $16,000
to $250,000, was quoted saying "some legitimate companies operate in a legal gray zone within the Zero-day market, selling exploits to governments and law enforcement agencies in countries across the world." Brian Krebs, a former Washington post reporter stated, "Most organizations are one Zero-day away from compromise, if it's a widely used piece of software, you've just got to assume these days that it's got vulnerabilities that the software vendors don't know aboutbut the bad guys do."
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Offshoring Software Development
Offshoring is work that is done for an organization at a site that is in an overseas location.
For the purposes of this paper, overseas is defined simply as crossing a border from one country to another. In other words, work can be offshored from the United States to Canada or Mexico.
Software development is defined simply as the process of creating software and can be divided into several activities or tasks. These tasks include: analysis, design, coding, testing, implementation, maintenance/support, project management, localization, and research and development. 15 Organizations that participate in offshoring will implement their approach to offshoring in many different ways. Some organizations offshore specific activities while others will move entire projects or processes.
Software development sent offshore is separated in to six categories (Table 1 ). This paper is focused on the first category; programming, software testing, and software maintenance. At this level, the offshore organization has access to the software development process and source code for software. India (Russia was not significant in this report). 19 These numbers include all R&D and not just software development. However, the trend is clearly shifting from India to China.
India is the world's largest engine for software development and has grown from simple coding in the 1970s to a leader in all areas of software development since the early 2000s. The
Association of Computing Machines (ACM) study credits the work necessary for the United
States and the world preparing for the Y2K problem for helping India's industry growth.
Software and service export firms in India are growing at 20-25% per year according to the best statistics available. 20 India's largest export is software services.
Russia is noteworthy in this market because software was a relatively neglected field during the Soviet era, but in the 1990s as the country transitioned to a market economy, many scientists and engineers moved from low-paid government and university positions into entrepreneurial firms and Russian subsidiaries of multinationals; and some of these people entered the software field. So far there are relatively few programmers, but wages are low, and technical skill is high. 21 According to the 2006 ACM study, China does not currently have a major impact on the world software economy and the industry is highly fragmented into many small companies.
Most of the offshoring in China is in the hardware industry. This may drive the Chinese software industry to focus on software embedded in hardware. Politically, the ACM study found that China was the most protectionists in its trade policies and there have been clear concerns of intellectual property rights infringement. 22 These political realities cause many businesses to find other offshore software development locations. However, it is clear that the trend has shift in the past 6 years and China is quickly catching up to India and may surpass them in software development in the coming years.
COTS Software is Everywhere
The government clearly made a change in the 1990s to bring more military capability to the DoD through procurement of COTS products. Information Technology (IT) procurement was targeted as an area to streamline through the purchase of COTS products including software. 23 The focus of the attention on COTS was to make it easier to keep up with changing technology and for the IT community in the DoD to build out networks on flexible and interoperable commercial standards. Russia has had ties to malware for years. Bill Brenner's article, "How Russia became a malware hornet's nest," questions why people from that part of the world are so determined to earn a living writing attack code. From earlier in this paper, the high tech and scientific workforce in Russia is underutilized. Eugene Kaspersky explained that many Russian programmers compare themselves to weapons manufacturers-they build the technology but are not the ones using it. He also feels the Russian economy is shaky enough that people are looking for a steady living and building malware is one way to do it.
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Acquisition Rules
At the national level, there are two important trade acts that influence the government purchase of foreign goods. The Buy America Act (BAA), which requires the US government to prefer US-made products in its purchases 35 states, "The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council shall ensure that, to the maximum extent practicable, the process for acquisition of information technology is a simplified, clear, and understandable process that specifically addresses the management of risk, incremental acquisition, and the need to incorporate commercial information technology in a timely manner." 40 This Act was instrumental in moving the Federal Government forward quickly with an expansion automated data processing equipment, networks, and software.
The key term in the Clinger-Cohen Act is the statement "management of risk." A cyber security professional could interpret this to mean the process for acquisition of IT must addresses the cyber security risk of purchasing commercial IT. However, this act was written in 1996 and was interpreted by acquisition professionals. 43 The checklists provided by NIST simply provide configuration settings required on standard software to address operational software threats. These setting changes do nothing to address the threat of Zero-day exploits.
The FAR also clearly specifies how government agencies purchase software through license agreements. These licensing agreements give the government no additional rights over the software except those identified in FAR section 12.212, Computer Software. These rights include the government's right to use, modify, reproduce, release, perform, display, or disclose commercial computer software or commercial computer software documentation except as mutually agreed to by the parties." 44 There is no right to or access provided to the source code of the software license purchased. This limits the depth of the assessment that can be made when reviewing the software product for vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability Identification Processes
The current processes used to assess the confidence and trust that software is free of vulnerabilities is the Information Assurance Vulnerability Management ( the product does what its developers say it does." 46 In other words, our process for evaluating software for vulnerabilities is to test it against known targets. The problem is that there are vulnerabilities, such as Zero-day exploits, for which we cannot test in this method with compiled software.
Mark Harman of University College London, makes the case for source code analysis and manipulation (SCAM). This is because source code is the only precise description of the behavior of the system. 47 The DSB Task Force on Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DoD
Software found the problem of detecting vulnerabilities is deeply complex and there is no silver bullet on the horizon. However, they go on to note that "through source code analysis tools….research has produced tremendous progress in software analysis tools and techniques for verifying safety and security of software prior to software deployment."
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Implications
Knowledge of software code provenance and access to source code are two important mitigation efforts that can improve cyberspace security for the DoD and could be initiated by tying cyber security principles more closely into the procurement process. Provenance and source code access are also the only way we will have access to identify zero-day exploits before our competitors get access to them.
The intent of this paper is not to limit the use of COTS software or place restrictions on which countries are providing software development to the commercial software industry. James A. Lewis stated, "greater use of COTS software and the changes in how companies make software mean that we can no longer make the same assumptions about security and trust." He proposes, "a remedy lies in better practices and processes for assurance and security and better knowledge of those practices and process for both producers and consumers." 49 The software development process is too complex for the US government to attempt to unwind and restructure the process.
However, it is vital for the government and commercial industry to know and understand the provenance or origin of software code used on their systems and networks. Provenance is defined by Godfry, German, Davies, & Hindle as "the documented history of a work of art, which can be used as a guide toward the work's authenticity." Applied in the software context, this is an understanding of where the code came from, why it exists, and what is its real history and origin. 50 This understanding provides government the ability to determine the risk and assign a level of "trust" in the software. FAR subpart 12.1, Acquisition of Commercial Items, should be updated to require COTS software providers to account for the software "provenance" or proof of the origin of their software code.
Although the DSB Task Force on Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DoD Software discourages the government from mandating access COTS source code, this may be a simple way to determine most vulnerabilities inherent in a complied software product. This report discouraged this mandate because of the fear of a loss of intellectual property by the government in the process of analyzing the source code. I feel that the government can establish a process to encourage software companies to provide source code in exchange for increased trust rating for their product and a government stamp of approval (similar to a UL label for safety on electrical equipment). Microsoft has provided the U.S. Government and institutes of higher education some access to its source code under certain conditions. However, it has also been reported that Additional work is also required to clarify disconnects between the BAA and TAA and to ensure "country of origin" is clearly understood for goods and services provided to the United
States over the internet. shown that there is a growing group of "entrepreneurs" willing to dedicate their computer science skills to exploiting software vulnerabilities. The US government should tap into this potential brain trust and incentivize the "hacktivist" to assist in the governments' efforts to secure the U.S. cyberspace.
Conclusion
Zero-day exploits are a dangerous threat to Defense networks which use vulnerabilities within COTS products to inflict damage in cyberspace. Vulnerabilities in COTS products can be introduced intentionally or unintentionally, but are exploited intentionally through Zero-day exploits. Globalization of the software development industry provides our competitors access to the software development process in ways that we don't understand unless we require this information from those developing the software. Access to source code that is used in COTS is the only way we can gain any situational awareness of how the code operates and where vulnerabilities exist. Finally, the FARs must be updated to ensure procurement of software products is balanced between streamlining access to advanced technology and cyberspace security.
